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Stephen Schiﬀer’s ﬁrst book, Meaning (1972), brought Gricean theories
of meaning to an unprecedented level of sophistication. Starting with
ideas about speaker’s meaning sketched by Grice, Schiﬀer developed in
great detail objections, responses to objections, responses to responses
to objections, and so on, ending on a generally optimistic note about
the viability of an intention-based theory of meaning. His second book,
Remnants of Meaning (1987), took a darker turn. Theories of language,
one by one, including the theory oﬀered in Meaning, were subjected to
very detailed criticisms, and were deemed beyond salvation. All that
remained was a ‘no-theory theory of meaning’, one of whose main ten-
ets was that nothing recognizable as a theory of meaning in the tradi-
tional sense was true. In the Introduction to The Things We Mean,
Schiﬀer says that he is now oﬀering a positive theory of meaning: ‘What
kind of chutzpah is this? Only a mild kind, actually’ (9). 
The things we mean, says Schiﬀer, are propositions, like the proposi-
tion that nothing travels faster than light, and a prima facie case for this
view is given by the ‘face value’ theory. Propositions are pleonastic enti-
ties, entities introduced by ‘something-from-nothing transformations’,
of which the leading examples are ﬁctional characters. Special features
of pleonastic entities are said to explain the nature of linguistic under-
standing, vagueness, morality, conditionals, and the possibility and
value of our knowledge of the propositional attitudes of others. This is
a wide-ranging and demanding book, covering a vast range of topics of
interest to philosophers of language and others. In this review, I have
chosen to concentrate on a small part of the book, choosing two issues
relating to its framework ((1) the face value theory and (2) the nature of
pleonastic entities), and two applications of this framework that I think
will attract attention ((3) moral judgements and (4) vagueness).
Among the larger parts that it would have been good to discuss are the
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account of understanding in chapters three and four, and the intriguing
discussion of conditionals (chapter seven); among the smaller ones is
the convincing short section (135–55) on two-dimensional semantics.
1. The face value theory
According to the face value theory, a sentence of the form ‘A believes
that S’ has the form Rab, and is true iﬀ ‘the referent of the term  “A”
stands in the belief relation to the proposition to which the  “that S”
term refers’ (12). Initial evidence for the theory comes from such infer-
ences as this:
Harold believes that there is life on Venus and so does Fiona.
So, there is something that they both believe—to wit, that there is
life on Venus.
Harold believes everything that Fiona says.
Fiona says that there is life on Venus.
So Harold believes that there is life on Venus.
There are other inferences in the same vein. They are supposed to pro-
vide a prima facie case for both a metaphysical conclusion (that belief is
a relation to propositions) and a semantic conclusion (that ‘that S’
expressions are singular terms referring to propositions). Similar infer-
ential patterns would favour one kind of conclusion rather than the
other:
Harold goes to market and so does Fiona.
So, there is something that they both do—to wit, go to market.
Harold does everything that Fiona does.
Fiona goes to market.
So Harold goes to market.
We may incline to the metaphysical conclusion that acting is a relation
between an agent and an action, but no one would consider that ‘goes to
market’ is a singular term referring to an individual action.1 In other
superﬁcially similar cases, the semantic conclusion is made appealing,
but not the metaphysical one. For example:
1 Schiﬀer says that one can infer sentences containing reference to events from sentences which
appear not to, and cites ‘Jane was born on a Tuesday, so Jane’s birth was on a Tuesday’ (63). The ex-
ample is a special case, since people can be born at most once; it does not ground the more general
conclusion.
Pleonastic Explanations 99
Mind, Vol. 114 .  453 . January 2005 © Sainsbury2005
Harold weighs 150 pounds and so does Fiona.
So, there is something that they both weigh—to wit, 150 pounds.
Harold weighs just what Fiona weighs.
Fiona weighs 150 pounds.
So Harold weighs 150 pounds.
No doubt ‘150 pounds’ refers to 150 pounds, but we may be much less
inclined to suppose that weight is a relation between an object and 150
pounds. Weight (or at least rest mass) is a paradigm of a monadic and
intrinsic property.
The face value theory would be more compelling if we had an expla-
nation of the general conditions under which the relevant inferences
deliver the desired conclusions (both metaphysical and semantic). The
relevant inferences will run in both directions, so the very ﬁrst ques-
tion, one which Schiﬀer does not mention, is why we should regard
them as showing that there really are such entities as properties and
propositions, rather than using the other direction of inference (the
Quinean one) to conclude that there are no such entities. There are also
more detailed diﬃculties. The face-value theory appears to endorse
substitution inferences that are incorrect for some of the constructions
traditionally classiﬁed as idioms of propositional attitude. There are
cases in which substituting ‘the proposition that S’ for the supposedly
coreferential ‘that S’ is not guaranteed to preserve truth, for the substi-
tution can ‘change the meaning drastically’ (93) as in:
Jane fears that Slovenia will win the world cup.
Jane fears the proposition that Slovenia will win the world cup.
And there are cases in which the substitution fails to preserve grammat-
icality, as in:
Jane hopes that Slovenia will win the world cup.
Jane hopes the proposition that Slovenia will win the world cup.
To infer from these failures that ‘the proposition that S’ does not have
the same referent as ‘that S’ is, Schiﬀer says, a ‘confusion’ (93). He
shows that there are special idioms in which the substitution of
uncontroversially coreferential expressions fails to preserve grammati-
cality:
The Italian singer Pavarotti never sings Wagner.
The Italian singer the greatest tenor never sings Wagner.
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Hence the case, based on failures to preserve grammaticality, against
the coreference of ‘that S’ with ‘the proposition that S’ would be com-
plete only if it could be shown that the relevant substitutions did not
infringe essentially insigniﬁcant grammatical constraints. Schiﬀer does
not provide any examples in which the substitution of uncontrover-
sially coreferential expressions preserves grammaticality but (in an
extensional context) does not preserve truth, nor does he oﬀer any the-
oretical considerations in defence of the face-value theory on this point,
so the reader may be left in ignorance of why it is a ‘confusion’ to sup-
pose that cases like Jane’s fear do not tell against the coreference of ‘the
proposition that S’ and ‘that S’.
Russell (1912) distinguished between knowledge by acquaintance and
knowledge of truth. To know the proposition that Bismarck was astute
is to be acquainted with it, and is diﬀerent from knowing that Bismarck
was astute. One is acquainted with a proposition by being acquainted
with all its constituents (together, perhaps, with its logical form). This
is necessary but not suﬃcient for knowing that it is true, that is, in the
example, for knowing that Bismarck was astute. The face value theory
must either say that this diﬀerence is of no signiﬁcance, or else that it
can be done justice to while retaining the doctrine about coreference.
2. Pleonastic entities
When a writer of ﬁction introduces a name (with the normal kinds of
intentions appropriate to her task), she thereby creates a ﬁctional char-
acter. No one will disagree. Schiﬀer interprets what has occurred in
what I call a ‘robust’ way: he says that, as a result, a ﬁctional entity
‘exists in its own right’; it is an abstract object as much part of the real
world as sets or numbers. On Schiﬀer’s view, ‘x is a ﬁctional entity’
entails ‘x is an entity’. On a more austere interpretation of the platitude
that novelists create ﬁctional characters, this entailment fails, just as the
entailment from ‘x is an alleged murderer’ to ‘x is a murderer’ fails. An
alleged murderer may not be a murderer, and alleging that there is a
murderer in the house does not make it the case that there is an alleged
murderer in the house. On the robust view, by contrast, a ﬁctional
entity is an entity, and to make up a ﬁction in which there is a certain
character is to bring it about that there is a new entity in the realm of
the real, an entity which is the subject of a variety of genuine, and not
merely ﬁctional, truths. ‘Fictional’ qualiﬁes a noun in the straightfor-
ward way that adjectives like ‘happy’ do. On a more austere interpreta-
tion, the role of ‘ﬁctional’ is more like a sentence operator, just as
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adjectival occurrences of ‘alleged’ are often best understood in terms of
‘it is alleged that’. To say that there are ﬁctional characters is, on the aus-
tere view, to say no more than that there are ﬁctions according to which
there are characters. Those who prefer an austere view will need to put
it on the back burner if they are to proﬁt from Schiﬀer’s use of ﬁctional
characters to introduce the idea of a pleonastic entity, for the discussion
is ﬁrmly, though without argument, committed to the robust view.
For ﬁctional characters, the something-for-nothing inference takes
you from a writer’s pretend use of a name to the existence of a corre-
sponding robust ﬁctional entity. The inference is guaranteed by the
supposed conceptual truth ‘that the existence of ﬁctional entities super-
venes on the pretending use of their names’ (52). One cannot always
rely on such conceptually based inferences: it may be a conceptual,
because stipulated, truth that a wishdate is someone whose existence
supervenes on, and is guaranteed by, a person wishing for a date, but
we should not infer from wishes for dates to wishdates. The reliable
inferences are ones which, roughly speaking, conservatively extend the
theory which obtains before the concept in question is introduced. The
wishdate inference is not reliable, since mere wishes would unconserva-
tively require revisions to population statistics.
Fictional characters are pleonastic entities created by human activity,
but this is not the right way to view all pleonastic entities, even though
all of them are closely tied, for their existence, to human activity (‘our
conceptual practices exhaust what may be true of all properties and
propositions’ (212)). Properties, though not created, are pleonastic,
since it is a conceptual truth they supervene on truths which appear not
to mention them. From the statement ‘Lassie is a dog’ we can infer ‘Las-
sie has the property of being a dog’, and so infer that there is at least one
property. Schiﬀer thinks of properties as abundant in the extreme, since
there is one for every intelligible predicate (barring a qualiﬁcation
about heterological-style paradoxes), and he endorses Armstrong’s
(1989) phrase that, on this conception, they are ‘mere shadows of predi-
cates’ (63). This makes them thin things: ‘there isn’t a lot more to [the
property of being a dog] than can be culled from the something-for-
nothing transformation’ (64), the one from ‘x is a dog’ to ‘x has the
property of being a dog’. This is not enough, Schiﬀer claims, for there to
be determinately true identity statements like: the property of being a
dog is the property of having such-and-such genotype, or the property
of being in pain is the property of being in such-and-such neural state.
The something-for-nothing transformations do not speak to these
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issues; hence there are no determinate facts of this kind. This is one
link between pleonastic entities and indeterminacy.
Propositions are pleonastic entities in virtue of the conceptual truth
that we can always move from ‘p’ to  ‘that p is true’. In conformity with
the face value theory, the latter sentence is to be parsed as starting with
a singular term whose referent is a proposition. We get propositions
from truths, in the something-for-nothing way, because there is a
transformation that  ‘takes us from “Lassie is a dog”’ to  ‘That Lassie is a
dog is true’ (71). If I know that Lassie is a dog, I can infer that that Lassie
is a dog is true, and so, on the proposed analysis, infer, and thereby
come to know, that there is such a proposition as that Lassie is a dog.
Are there false propositions? Presumably there should be; but what is
false cannot be known, and so we cannot use the pattern of inference
just described in order to come to know that there are such things.
Maybe we should use the truth schema  ‘The proposition that S is true
iﬀ S’ and argue by dilemma, one horn of which delivers  ‘The proposi-
tion that S is not true’, which will be enough to infer (and so come to
know, once the rest of the argument is set out) that there is such a thing
as the proposition that S. Whether arguments by dilemma are valid in
the indeterministic logic to which Schiﬀer subscribes is a question he
does not address.
Propositions are shadows of sentences, so adding them  ‘does noth-
ing to disturb the pre-existing causal order’; they constitute a conserva-
tive extension. But they are not so shadowy as properties, since their
role in propositional attitudes belongs to their nature but  ‘is not
deducible from the something-for-nothing practice’ (72). Examining
propositional attitudes, Schiﬀer reaches the conclusion that they are
relations to  ‘unstructured but very ﬁne-grained propositions’ (84), and
he goes on to explain this departure from the less ontologically robust
view he had taken earlier (in Remnants). 
A salient feature of Schiﬀer’s pleonastic propositions is that the  ‘that
S’ singular terms which refer to them do so in an  ‘importantly diﬀer-
ent’ way from the way in which normal singular terms refer to their ref-
erents. In the normal case, competent speakers bring their knowledge
of the referent of a referring expression to bear when trying to deter-
mine whether a sentence containing it is true or false. In the special case
of  ‘that S’ expressions, Schiﬀer says that this is not always so. We know
that  ‘Lois believes that Superman ﬂies’ may diﬀer in truth value from
‘Lois believes that Clark Kent ﬂies’  ‘and on this basis we know that the
proposition that Superman ﬂies  the proposition that Clark Kent ﬂies’
(77). The idea is that we come to individuate propositions only on the
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basis of their occurrence in belief ascriptions, but it is not clear that the
argument establishes this. We might not know whether the proposition
that Clark Kent ﬂies is the same as or diﬀerent from the proposition
that Superman ﬂies while knowing what proposition each is, just as we
can know which person Tully is and which person Cicero is without
knowing whether they are the same or diﬀerent, or which person
Strawson (Peter) is and which person Strawson (Galen) is without
knowing that they are diﬀerent. Even so, Schiﬀer’s argument might
establish that there was something special about  ‘that S’ clauses if it
established that we can test them for coreference by embedding them,
but that we cannot do this for ordinary referring expressions. Concern-
ing the pair  ‘Henri admires Picasso’ and  ‘Henri admires Braque’,
Schiﬀer invites us to consider  ‘the absurdity of supposing that we know
that Picasso  Braque because we know that the statements [just men-
tioned] may diﬀer in truth value’ (73). The example is a little confusing
because of the seeming non-extensionality of  ‘admires’ (it seems that
one may admire Tully without admiring Cicero). But for ordinary
extensional cases, the supposedly absurd pattern of inference, or some-
thing very like it, is commonplace. If we ﬁnd that  ‘The murderer wears
size 10 shoes’ and  ‘Jack wears size 10 shoes’ actually diﬀer in truth
(which implies that they can diﬀer in truth value) we are happy to infer
the distinctness of Jack and the murderer. What does the work in such a
case is actual diﬀerence of truth value, whereas Schiﬀer’s point was
made in terms of merely possible diﬀerence of truth value; so perhaps
the criticism misses the mark. What emerges is a somewhat diﬀerent
diﬀerence between  ‘that S’ referring expressions and others. On ordi-
nary post-Kripke assumptions, identities are necessary, so the meta-
physical possibility of distinctness is enough for the actuality of
distinctness. In the case of Lois’s beliefs about Kent/Superman, we
know a priori that there is a possible diﬀerence in truth value, and so a
possible diﬀerence in referent for the  ‘that S’ clauses, and so an actual
diﬀerence in referent. In the case of Jack and the murderer, we have no
such apriori knowledge of possible distinctness. Possible distinctness
could only be inferred from actual distinctness. So the real diﬀerence
which emerges is simply that we often have apriori knowledge of same-
ness and diﬀerence among propositions.
3. Moral realism 
In chapter six, Schiﬀer agrees with cognitivists that there are such
things as moral propositions, pleonastic ones, of course; but concedes
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to non-cognitivists that  ‘there are no determinate moral truths’ (238).
Hence there is no moral knowledge (so it may be confusing that he
allows his position to be called cognitivist). His discussion presents
some brilliantly clear arguments, yet the conclusion seems to me one
which few will accept, for it entails that we are in error if we conﬁdently
believe that torturing children for fun is morally wrong.
Schiﬀer admits that if the indeterminacy of moral propositions were
generally appreciated, moral debate as we now know it would end. The
best philosophers, as Yeats might have said, would lack all conviction.
Rather than disagree about whether, say, the death penalty is morally
legitimate, we would agree that this is an issue on which we should have
no conviction, and something we should not, indeed could not, sensi-
bly dispute, since it is known to be indeterminate. Schiﬀer thinks this
upshot is not as absurd as it sounds, for there would still be room for us
to agree or disagree on what we wanted and wanted others to want, and
moral words might serve as  ‘quick and easy ways’ (261) to mark these
things out.  ‘We don’t need morality to keep us from torturing children
for the fun of it’ (251). Although he is ﬁrmly of the opinion that moral
education can and should help to shape or curb desires (personal com-
munication), it is hard to see how the oﬃcial doctrine allows for this.
At a minimum, such education would need to draw a veil over the facts
that none of the moral opinions, the instilling of which is supposed to
shape desires, are determinately true, and that no one whose metaphys-
ics was correct should have any conﬁdence in these opinions.
How does the doctrine of pleonastic entities help explain the exist-
ence, but indeterminacy, of moral propositions? Schiﬀer provides two
arguments for the existence of moral propositions. 2One is based on
applying the face value theory to truths like  ‘Sally believes that eating
animals is wrong’. The other is that  ‘moral sentences embed in sen-
tences that evidently have truth values’ (240) and this requires them to
express propositions. Let us grant this (passing over Schiﬀer’s detailed
and nuanced discussion of opposing arguments), and press more
closely on the explanation for the indeterminacy.
There are two issues in play. One is that it is, supposedly, possible to
be ambivalent about any moral proposition even though one is in an
epistemically ideal position to know that it is true (if it is true) or false
2 He lists four. The ﬁrst (the inference from  ‘Eating animals is wrong’ to  ‘It is true that eating
animals is wrong’) is not available in the dialectical context, since using it to extract knowledge
that there are moral propositions requires knowledge of the premiss, which is just what is in dis-
pute (and Schiﬀer’s own view is that we do not have this knowledge). The fourth listed reason is
that  ‘whatever reasons there are for accepting [the theory of pleonastic propositions] are ipso facto
reasons for thinking there are moral propositions’ (240). 
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(if it is false); this alone is enough to ensure that all moral propositions
are indeterminate (254). The other is that the application of moral con-
cepts is taken to supervene at least in part on conative facts; this is why
moral concepts do not have determinate applications (257–8). 
The relevant ambivalence is an attitude that Schiﬀer describes in
more detail in his chapter on vagueness (chapter ﬁve). It is a special
kind of partial belief, referred to as a VPB (a Vagueness-related Partial
Belief (201)). The general principle is that if any rational person can
VPB a proposition, while also being in a state epistemically ideal with
respect to the proposition, the proposition is indeterminate. This is
exempliﬁed by the possibility that someone who has full information
about the number of hairs on Tom’s head should be ambivalent about
whether Tom is bald. That there could be such a person is enough to
establish that it is indeterminate whether Tom is bald. Likewise, Schiﬀer
urges, for any moral principle, an ideally rational person may be in
such a state of partial belief about the proposition (254). Hence all
moral principles are indeterminate. This argument draws on Schiﬀer’s
earlier discussion of vagueness, and will be considered below (§4).
The argument special to morality is based on one or more superven-
ience claims, in which conative states are said to feature among what is
subvenient. Those who believe in moral properties typically believe that
their distribution supervenes on non-moral properties: necessarily,
things that diﬀer in moral properties also diﬀer in non-moral proper-
ties. Schiﬀer, however, has a stronger supervenience principle in mind:
‘It belongs to our moral concepts that their application must supervene
on the application of some non-normative concept’ (257). When
Schiﬀer speaks of  ‘application’, I presume he does not mean to claim
that acts of applying moral concepts supervene on acts of applying
non-moral ones: someone could apply a moral concept to something
without also applying a non-moral one, and this possibility ensures
that there could be things which diﬀer in which moral concepts have
been applied to them but not with respect to which non-moral con-
cepts have been applied to them. Schiﬀer may intend a normative ver-
sion of this claim, perhaps to this eﬀect: if one can justiﬁably apply a
concept to just one of two things, there is a non-moral concept which
one can justiﬁably apply to just one of the things. This would probably
receive widespread support, but Schiﬀer’s dialectic requires something
somewhat diﬀerent: that if ever a thinker applies a moral concept to
something, there are non-normative conditions which, perhaps implic-
itly, the thinker takes to be suﬃcient for the application of the moral
concept to be correct (257, same paragraph as sentence recently
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quoted). In other words, Schiﬀer holds that belief in a conditional
which states how the moral supervenes on the non-moral is implicated
in every moral judgement.
An even stronger doctrine is explicitly formulated: if there is moral
truth there are knowable, and known,  ‘moral principles’ (that is,
supervenience conditionals: necessarily true propositions of the form
‘whatever has  has M ’ ( a non-normative property, M a moral prop-
erty) (245–6)). Everyone who believes in supervenience believes there
are true moral principles (in this sense), but it is consistent to hold that
we have moral knowledge without knowledge of these truths. This is
the position taken by particularists (Jonathan Dancy is a notable exam-
ple). They hold that moral knowledge starts with particular cases. We
may have qualiﬁed beliefs in generalizations, but we realize that these
are at best useful rules of thumb (like  ‘Lying is wrong’), expediting
decisions under stress or uncertainty, rather than exact truths. We can
usually think of exceptions to generalizations, and even if we cannot,
we are right to be cautious about them. This does not undermine
proper conﬁdence in moral judgements concerning particular cases;
generally, we are much more conﬁdent that a particular action is right
or wrong than we are of how to generalize this judgement. The position
is consistent with the supervenience of the distribution of moral prop-
erties on that of non-normative properties. It is also consistent with the
controversial claim that justifying a moral opinion concerning some
action requires one to cite at least one of its non-normative features.
What it denies is that we can or need to know the relevant superveni-
ence conditionals, the  ‘moral principles’. 
Consider the following analogy. Many theorists agree that the mental
supervenes on the physical in that there cannot be a mental diﬀerence
without a physical diﬀerence. Some of these theorists may also hold,
controversially, that justifying an opinion concerning a mental prop-
erty of a person, for example the opinion that Sally is in pain, requires
one to cite at least one non-mental property of that person, for example
that Sally is crying and her toe is bloody. All this is consistent with the
claim that we have some justiﬁed beliefs, indeed knowledge, concerning
who has what mental properties without knowing any supervenience
conditionals. We know quite well that though Sally is in pain, not eve-
ryone who cries and has a bloody toe is in pain.
The main thrust of Schiﬀer’s explanation of the special nature of
moral properties and propositions, however, does not depend on
whether we have knowledge of moral principles. Rather, it depends
upon the supposedly conative elements in the subvenient non-norma-
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tive properties. The oﬃcial doctrine is that this base consists in the
application of concepts for conative properties, but as far as I can see
the explanation would not be substantially diﬀerent if Schiﬀer were to
think of the base as simply the conative properties themselves. How do
these induce indeterminacy? It seems unlikely that the answer can be in
terms of indeterminacy in what each person wants. The crucial point is
said to be that we want diﬀerent things (256, reinforced by a personal
communication), but it remains to be explained how this leads to inde-
terminacy. The value of a stock market index (like the Dow Jones)
supervenes upon the value of the underlying stocks. These subvenient
values may move in diﬀerent directions without inducing any indeter-
minacy in the index.
4. Vagueness
New theories of vagueness are not abundant, and Schiﬀer’s chapter on
this subject is likely to be widely discussed. He claims that rather than
being semantic, epistemic or ontological, vagueness is a psychological
phenomenon. It arises from the special kinds of partial beliefs already
mentioned: VPBs, or vagueness-related partial beliefs. These come in
degrees which can, under idealization, be described in terms of num-
bers between 0 and 1, and they are to be distinguished in various ways
from degrees of belief in the sense of subjective probability, s-beliefs.
VPBs do not mark ignorance,  ‘we couldn’t have VPBs if our language
were perfectly precise’, and complex VBPs combine diﬀerently from the
way in which subjective probabilities combine (in the manner of
Lucasiewicz rather than Kolmogorov).
Schiﬀer proposes to deﬁne borderline cases, and hence vagueness, in
terms of VPBs: at a ﬁrst approximation, an object x is a borderline case
with respect to F iﬀ someone in ideal epistemic conditions (which
include that the person  ‘is ideally rational in the relevant respects’
(209)) could believe to some intermediate degree that x is F (210; the
ﬁnal version, labelled (E), is on 212, and is displayed and discussed
below). It is not that VPBs track the property of being borderline;
rather they constitute what it is to be borderline (211). That is what
makes vagueness a psychological phenomenon. If VPBs tracked being
borderline, being borderline would be a phenomenon which is in some
sense independent of VPBs. The tracking view would introduce a
‘third possibility’, which, following Crispin Wright, Schiﬀer rejects. On
third possibility views, indeterminacy (or being borderline) is a  ‘kind
of determinate truth status … contrasting with both the poles (truth
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and falsity)’ (Wright, quoted by Schiﬀer on 191). If VPBs tracked being
borderline, then, in ideal epistemic conditions, having a VPB would be
the unique rational response to a borderline case, which would ensure
that the case contrasts with both truth and falsity, and so would consti-
tute a  ‘third possibility’. This means that when Schiﬀer deﬁnes being
borderline in terms of the possibility of someone having a VPB* (that
is, a VPB formed under ideal epistemic conditions), he cannot include
being a good tracker of borderlineness as part of what it is for a subject
to be rational. How does the rationality requirement work out?
Schiﬀer invites us to consider a possible situation in which Tom’s
hairs are plucked out one by one. Sally, a rational speaker of English,
observes the process closely. She  ‘starts out judging with absolute cer-
tainty that Tom is not bald … At some point, however, Sally’s judge-
ment that Tom isn’t bald will have an ever so slightly diminished
conﬁdence, reﬂecting that she believes Tom not to be bald to some
degree barely less than 1. The plucking continues and as it does the
degree to which she believes Tom not to be bald diminishes …’ (203).
Schiﬀer envisages the changing degrees of VPBs to be reﬂected in  ‘qual-
iﬁed judgements’, though we are not told what the qualiﬁcations are
(whether they qualify the conﬁdence as in  ‘I am not sure but I think
maybe he is not bald’ or the content as in  ‘(I am sure) he is verging on
bald’). Why should a rational person respond like Sally? Why should
she not just become confused, making no assertions or judgements for
quite a while? Why might not questioning result in stony silence or
protestations of ignorance? Why should she not fail to form any  ‘set-
tled disposition’ (216) to judge? Why should she not judge without
qualiﬁcation that Tom is not bald until the last hair is pulled out, and
then switch to the other judgement? Why should she not, given some
suitable further aim, simply make a completely legitimate ruling, local
to the particular case or just to cases resembling it in terms of the aim in
question, on when Tom is to count as bald? Schiﬀer does not say.
Although he says that Sally’s responses may vary in small ways without
prejudice to her rationality (214), he does not consider more radically
distinct alternative responses. He cannot rule these irrational on the
grounds of their being rationally inappropriate to borderlineness. This
would presuppose that Sally’s responses, if rational, should track the
phenomenon of borderlineness, whereas Schiﬀer’s theory is that the
responses constitute the phenomenon:  ‘When the sentence ‘Tom is
bald’ goes into Sally’s VPB box, it is not as a response to her perception
of the independently explicable fact that he’s a borderline case of bald-
ness’ (212). 
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Compare Schiﬀer’s position with a theory according to which beauty
is  ‘response-dependent’: the property is constituted by the fact that
people respond to things which possess it in a distinctive way. Could a
theorist of this ilk require that we should consider only the responses of
people who are  ‘ideally rational in the relevant respects’, so that, for
example, people who do not get the distinctive response in the presence
of Michelangelo’s David thereby count as irrational? This may not be an
impossible path but it is certainly a treacherous one. The alleged irra-
tionality cannot consist simply in the fact that the subject did not evince
the statistically more common response. Some independent failure
needs to be identiﬁed.
Schiﬀer might say that it is irrelevant to his theory that rational
responses very diﬀerent from Sally’s are possible. All his theory requires
is that Sally’s is one possible way for a rational person to behave. The
existence of this possibility is what constitutes vagueness, regardless of
what other possibilities there are. The diﬃculty with this approach is
that we need some explanation for selecting Sally’s responses, rather
than others, as guides to the nature of vagueness. In setting out the
ﬁnished deﬁnition of a borderline case, Schiﬀer narrows appropriate
responses in the direction of Sally’s kind rather than the others:
one’s VPB* that x is F is F-concept-driven when one is in ideal cir-
cumstances for judging x to be F and one’s concept of being F
precludes one from s-believing to any positive degree either that x is
F or that x is not F and determines one to v-believe to some positive
degree that x is F. Then we can say that:
(E) x is a borderline case of being F iﬀ someone could have
an F-concept-driven VPB* that x is F. (212)
Schiﬀer must deny the following:
if x is F, nothing in the concept of being F precludes one from s-be-
lieving to a positive degree that this is so. 
For if x is borderline for F, something in the concept of being F pre-
cludes one (according to (E)) from s-believing that x is F, so, granted
the displayed principle, one would have to conclude that x is not F;
being borderline would be a clear third possibility. Classically, to deny
the principle is to assert that there is at least one F which something in
the concept of being F precludes one from s-believing to be F. Our con-
cepts preclude s-belief in some cases in which our epistemic situation is
optimal and the belief would be true. This suggests that  ‘conceptual’
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rather than  ‘psychological’ might be the best name for Schiﬀer’s
claimed source of vagueness. In this perspective, what needs explaining
in terms of our psychology is the quirk that draws us to form such
strange concepts. Any explanation of vagueness needs to mention our
limited powers of discrimination and the fact that many properties of
interest to us come in degrees which are apparently, or eﬀectively, con-
tinuous. It is not clear how one can tie such platitudes to Schiﬀer’s
appeal to psychology as the source or essence of vagueness.
Those who, like Carneades, respond to borderlines by silence (or
professions of ignorance, or confusion, or ruling, or anything other
than a v-belief) must be said not to be masters of the relevant concepts
or else not fully rational. Call a thinker a thinker* if she is fully rational,
is master of the concept F and is confronted by a borderline case for F
under ideal epistemic conditions. For Schiﬀer, this means that there
could be an F-concept-driven VPB* to the eﬀect that x is F. So there
could be a thinker*, someone who is  ‘precluded’ from forming s-beliefs
and  ‘determined’ to form v-beliefs. At ﬁrst it might seem that this is
consistent with there also being another thinker*, say Carneades, who
fails to form v-beliefs in the presence of borderline cases for F. We
might think the right analogy is with the clearly consistent claim that it
is possible that there be something happy and also possible that there
be something not-happy. But this is not right. The possibility relates to
there being someone in the position of a thinker*: rational, master of
the concept, and confronted with a borderline case for it. It is in virtue
of being a thinker* that one is precluded from forming s-beliefs and
determined to form v-beliefs, so Schiﬀer is committed to saying that,
quite generally, fully rational thinkers who confront a borderline case
for F and who are masters of F are precluded from forming s-beliefs
and determined to form v-beliefs. Since Carneades does not form a v-
belief concerning x being F, he is either not master of the concept F or
else not fully rational. Since his response seems to me an eminently
rational one for a master of a vague concept, I cannot accept Schiﬀer’s
account of vagueness.3
3 Thanks to members of a Reading Group at King’s College London with whom I discussed
Schiﬀer’s book in the summer of 2004, especially Scott Sturgeon; and to Stephen Schiﬀer for com-
ments and clariﬁcations.
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